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PersPective
Prospects for radical emissions reduction through 
behavior and lifestyle change
Introduction
In its most recent assessment of the published academic 
literature on climate change, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that lim-
iting climate change “will require substantial and sus-
tained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions” [1, p. 19], a 
point which has been emphasized previously by numer-
ous other expert bodies and authors. In 2009, a joint 
statement by the G8+5 (group of eight highly indus-
trialized countries, plus Brazil, China, India, Mexico 
and South Africa) science academies stressed that “[t]he 
need for urgent action to address climate change is now 
indisputable” [201], while in 2007 the Stern Review of the 
economics of climate change likewise asserted that cli-
mate change “demands an urgent global response” [2, p. i].
The case for rapid and deep cuts in emissions has 
thus been established across multiple scientific and 
socio-economic assessments – and while progress on 
this at an international level has stalled [3], many con-
stituencies recognize the need for substantial emissions 
reduction. The UK, for instance, has set a unique and 
unilateral legal target of at least an 80% decrease in 
national greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, enshrined 
in the Climate Change Act of 2008 [4]. This has been 
applauded as a forward-looking and ambitious piece of 
legislation, albeit one that is precarious in the face of 
politically destabilizing circumstances [5].
The achievement of actual emissions1 reduction in 
line with aims such as these clearly requires a wide-rang-
ing portfolio of mitigation options. In particular, there 
has been growing interest within the social sciences in 
managing carbon reductions through techniques that 
influence environmentally significant behaviors and 
lifestyles at the individual and household level. That this 
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could contribute to meaningful mitigation of climate 
change has been asserted by numerous authors [6–12]. 
Given that carbon emissions can be argued to derive 
ultimately from attempts by individuals and house-
holds to satisfy their needs and desires [13], it has even 
been proposed that dangerous climate change cannot 
be avoided without behavioral change by individuals 
and communities [2]. As Gifford [10, p. 273] argues in 
this regard:
[P]sychologists have long recognised [that] the funda-
mental unit of analysis for the human-caused portion 
of climate change is the person…. Thus, ultimately, 
amelioration of that part of…climate change over 
which we have some potential control occurs at the 
individual level.
While not all social scientists agree that the indi-
vidual is the appropriate unit of analysis [14], a point we 
return to later, research studies investigating the experi-
ences of those individuals who have pursued low-carbon 
lifestyles demonstrate that there does exist substantial 
potential for behavior change to achieve emissions 
reduction [15–17]. Nevertheless, we express serious con-
cern in this article that it is difficult to point to any 
reliable, generalizable evidence of substantive, sustained 
behavioral engagement with climate change among the 
broader general public. For all intents and purposes, 
everyday life goes on in a manner largely insensible to 
the rhetoric of urgency and supposed centrality of life-
style changes alluded to above.
In the present article, we consider approaches from 
across the social sciences designed to deliberately reduce 
carbon emissions at the personal and household scale 
through influencing environmentally significant behav-
iors and/or practices. We examine the extent to which 
the ambitions of the social sciences in this field have 
been realized, and ask what level of emissions reduction 
is realistically achievable using conventional approaches. 
Recognizing that attempts to change behavior – indeed, 
the agenda of “behavior change” itself – are situated 
in a particular socio-political context, we question 
the assumptions and conventions implicit in many 
approaches to date, and argue that they have precluded 
more radical change from being achieved. We propose 
some means by which social science approaches to per-
sonal emissions reduction could move in a direction 
more commensurate with the imperatives of genuinely 
radical change.
In this article we focus most closely upon approaches 
designed to alter individual behavior – in large part, 
because these have tended to dominate both the 
research and policy literature [14,18]. A recognition of 
the limitations of such strategies is nevertheless built 
into our critique of social science approaches to date, as 
well as our considerations for more radical approaches to 
achieving emissions reduction in the future. We define 
“radical” principally in respect of the scale of emissions 
cuts needed to effectively tackle climate change (radical 
environmental impacts), but, by implication, because 
of the steps required for achieving this scale of change, 
we imply challenging the status quo and transform-
ing social science approaches to behavior and lifestyle 
change (radical institutional impacts). While there is 
substantial debate concerning the exact scale of reduc-
tions required in developed nations such as the UK, we 
assume that radical emissions reduction may be quanti-
fied in the region of 6–9% per annum, and/or 80% total 
reductions by 2050 based on 1990 levels, as articulated 
in research by the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change 
Research, the UK Government's own targets and Ekins 
et al. [4,19,20].
Emissions reduction within reach of current 
approaches
A variety of interventions, innovations and conceptual 
frameworks have been premised on the idea that mean-
ingful emissions reduction, and pro-environmental 
changes more generally, can be brought about through 
behavior change [21–24]. In terms of the extent of emis-
sions reduction possible through these approaches, Dietz 
et al. [25] conclude that a 20% cut in emissions could 
in principle be obtained at the household level in the 
United States – although these authors do include tech-
nical and structural measures (such as upgrading home 
heating systems and purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles) 
within their scoping study. UK analyses indicate cuts 
of at least 60% are possible in home energy use [26] and 
in national emissions [19]; however, these are foreseen 
through primarily technical and legislative change, 
accompanied by small-scale behavioral measures, such 
as informational feedback and product labelling.
Some characteristic approaches applied in recent 
years to bring about pro-environmental behavior change 
include informational measures such as providing feed-
back on energy use, motivational strategies such as goal-
setting and commitment-making and a range of other 
individual, social and group-based approaches [23,27]. 
Social marketing techniques have been widely used in 
an attempt to persuade people to change their behav-
iors [28, though see 29] and, more recently, approaches from 
behavioral economics have been applied to “nudge” peo-
ple in a particular direction on environmental issues 
[30,31]. As well as there being multiple approaches to 
effecting change, a range of environmentally signifi-
cant behaviors has been targeted – including recycling, 
domestic heating, personal transportation and home 
appliance use.
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Although many behavior change interventions are 
premised on the need to reduce personal emissions, the 
promotion of “pro-environmental” actions may also 
occur for other reasons, such as resource conservation 
(in the case of recycling), or reducing air pollution (in 
the case of transport). Nevertheless, the extent to which 
the behavior change envisaged by these programs of 
research translates into intended or actual emissions 
reduction is rarely apparent. One of the more recent and 
detailed meta-analyses in this area by Osbaldiston and 
Schott (2012) was able to make distinctions between the 
applicability of different strategies according to types of 
behavior, but did not present findings as to the abso-
lute level of emissions reduction achievable using such 
strategies [23]. Nevertheless, a number of reviews have 
now attempted to quantify the amount of change that 
can be attained. These have focussed most often on 
behaviors relating to home energy use (e.g., from heating 
and electricity consumption), as well as transportation 
(e.g., car travel).
Thirty-eight studies designed to reduce household 
energy use, mostly through social psychological inter-
ventions, were examined by Abrahamse et al. [27]. The 
techniques applied across these studies included both 
“antecedent” interventions (designed to influence deter-
minants of energy use, such as through the setting of 
household energy reduction targets or provision of 
information) and “consequent” interventions (designed 
to shape behavior through positive or negative conse-
quences for actions taken, such as through provision of 
feedback or monetary rewards). While there was sub-
stantial variation across the studies, energy reductions 
averaged about 10% (ranging from null results to 21%), 
although many studies did not follow up on whether 
these effects were sustained over time.
In an examination of feedback mechanisms designed 
to reduce domestic electricity consumption, Fischer 
[32] likewise proposed typical reductions of between 
5 and 12%, based on an extensive overview of five 
prior review studies and 21 original research projects 
[see also 33,34]. A further review by RAND Europe [35] 
examining 48 studies across a broad range of environ-
mentally significant behaviors arrived at a similar order 
of magnitude for behavioral interventions. Although 
one study examined had achieved 17% savings in gas 
usage through an intensive team-based intervention, 
energy reductions of 10% or less were again found to 
be typical for behavior change interventions (where 
changes to physical environments such as installing 
insulation are excluded). This degree of change is like-
wise reflected in a meta-analysis by Möser and Bamberg 
[36] of 141 studies specifically targeting travel behavior, 
which concluded that an “achievable” increase in the 
proportion of non-car trips was around the 7% level. 
Again with respect to travel behavior, a further review 
by Ogilvie et al. (2004) of 22 studies aimed at shifting 
people's transport from car to walking and cycling con-
cluded that while there is some evidence that targeted 
campaigns can bring about change among those who 
are already motivated, for the most part, interventions 
have not been very effective [37].
These appraisals of the effectiveness of behavioral 
interventions, taken together, suggest that although it 
has been possible to bring about some reductions in per-
sonal and household emissions, this has not come close 
to the scale of change required under a radical emis-
sions reduction scenario. A number of further factors 
also limit the extent to which current behavior change 
approaches are able to achieve meaningful emissions 
reduction, as we now discuss.
Limitations of current approaches for the 
achievement of radical change
Any behavioral reduction in emissions might be con-
sidered – a priori – to be valuable as part of a wider 
national effort. It is important, however, to note several 
general limitations of the field overall, which raise seri-
ous questions about the possibility of whether “radical” 
emissions reductions are within reach of the sorts of 
approaches currently used by the social sciences.
First, while a range of behaviors has been encom-
passed across the research literature, the interventions 
considered have almost without exception focussed 
upon direct emissions (within the home or from per-
sonal transportation) or domestic recycling, with very 
little attention paid to indirect emissions arising from 
consumption activities, through carbon embedded in 
products and services, such as food, consumer electron-
ics, clothing and recreation. As Bailey et al. [38] note, 
however, meat and dairy products alone represent a 
greater share of emissions than those deriving from all 
worldwide road transportation, trains, shipping and air 
travel.
Taking into account that direct emissions account 
for only around 30% of households' total emissions (as 
illustrated in Figure 1; see also [13,39,40]; Gough et al. [41] 
suggest a figure closer to 20%) not focussing on indirect 
emissions therefore represents a major exclusion.2 Given 
that the reviews discussed above point to a figure of 
around 10% reduction in direct emissions obtainable 
from behavioral interventions, this in turn therefore 
represents only about 3% of total emissions.
As well as the restricted focus on a subset of house-
hold emissions, there is also a wider sense in which the 
environmental behavior change agenda has confined 
itself to pursuing what Thøgersen and Crompton [43] 
refer to as “simple and painless” lifestyle change. The 
promotion of actions which are in themselves largely 
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inconsequential has become widespread: examples these 
authors provide from real-world campaigns include 
turning off computer screens while at lunch, using a 
glass instead of a plastic cup, or printing double-sided. 
However, and as Thøgersen and Crompton pointedly 
affirm, there is a large disparity between such actions 
and what is actually required for effective emissions 
reduction:
The comfortable perception that global environmen-
tal challenges can be met through marginal lifestyle 
changes no longer bears scrutiny. The cumulative 
impact of large numbers of individuals making mar-
ginal improvements in their environmental impact 
will be a marginal collective improvement in envi-
ronmental impact. [43, p. 141]
Another author who has pointed out the limitations 
and dangers implicit in such a narrow framing of behav-
ioral responses to climate change is MacKay [44, p. 114], 
who argues that the notion “little changes can make 
a big difference” is “bunkum” (i.e., nonsense) in the 
context of climate change. Furthermore, it has been sug-
gested that conveying the impression that only minor 
changes in behavior are needed could lead a skeptical 
public to conclude that there is consequently little value 
in their being engaged [45] and that, as such, a nar-
row behavioral framing is incommensurate with more 
genuinely radical social engagement with sustainabil-
ity [46,47]. Minor behavioral changes may even lead to 
increased emissions in other areas via rebound effects [48], 
as in one striking case study highlighted by Chitnis 
et al. (2013) where consumers were encouraged by a 
supermarket marketing campaign to “turn lights into 
flights” by earning “airmiles” through the purchase of 
energy-efficient lightbulbs [49]. Catlin and Wang [50] 
outline a similar dilemma with respect to the links 
between resource use and recycling expectations: there 
may be a “moral license” to consume more if there is an 
expectation that products will be recycled rather than 
disposed of.
A focus upon low-impact behaviors is neverthe-
less typical in many social marketing campaigns. In 
attempting to encourage pro-environmental behaviors, 
many organizations, both governmental and non-
governmental, have emphasized short-term pragmatic 
actions as a response to climate change [29]. It is reason-
able to ask whether the fetishization of such actions as 
switching televisions off standby [51] and recycling [52] 
is related (at least in part) to a parallel focus on such 
actions by the social sciences – as illustrated by the large 
and still-growing number of studies examining the psy-
chological determinants of recycling behavior [53–55].
A further limitation of social science approaches to 
date is that even the reductions in household emissions 
outlined above have been achieved for the most part 
only in targeted experimental settings or small-scale test 
sites. Typically, the number of households participating 
in such research is in the tens or hundreds, although this 
does vary widely [34]. Such research is often resource-
intensive, requiring substantial commitment and over-
sight from researchers. The interventions used vary in 
their approach: examples include provision to house-
holds of feedback through real-time energy displays, 
and personalized travel plans to reduce car use [27,36]. 
It is important to note, however, that such interven-
tions are not intended primarily to achieve actual emis-
sions reduction at any meaningful scale; rather, they are 
designed to test and develop research concepts and/or 
best practice. While this ensures methodological rigor, 
it has meant that the potential for scaling up interven-
tions is not generally pursued, with the consequence 
that even well-evidenced ways of bringing about emis-
sions reduction have rarely been implemented beyond 
the initial scope of a research project.
A final limitation to the pursuit of individual emis-
sions reduction, as outlined at length within the cri-
tiques by social practice theorists such as Shove [14], is 
that the predominant emphases to date upon “behav-
iors” (which are presumed to be directed by individual 
attitudes and choices) has restricted the ways in which 
the relationship between householders' energy use and 
the realities of their daily lives has been conceptual-
ized. It has been argued that the ever closer focus on 
the determinants of individual behavior is distracting 
researchers and policy-makers alike from addressing 
difficult and important challenges concerning the 
social and economic circumstances which give rise to 
unsustainable practices [56]. As Shove [14] has argued, 
Figure 1. Proportion of UK household emissions from direct and 
indirect sources. Data taken from [39] and based on UK figures from 
2000.
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certain social and infrastructural factors lead unavoid-
ably to certain patterns of demand. These may include 
the ways in which essential services such as food and 
water are provided, as well as a range of expectations 
that are placed upon people. For example, that which 
Shove terms the “contemporary enthusiasm” for twice-
daily showering is underpinned by aspects such as the 
need to project social status through one's appearance, 
a duty to be healthy and clean, and the pleasurable and 
curative properties of bathing [57]. In a related way, as 
Hargreaves et al. [58] have pointed out, ethnographic 
research has shown huge disparities in energy consump-
tion even across ostensibly similar households, due in 
large part to variability in the underlying social and 
cultural aspects of energy use. As Gram-Hanssen [59] 
argues, this may be driven by a range of contextual fac-
tors such as the different ways in which the members of 
a household are responsible for monitoring its heating, 
variability in how sections of the home are utilized and 
differences between households in what is considered a 
“comfortable” indoor temperature [59].
The wide variability in home energy use is further 
emphasized by Galvin [60], who presents a tripar-
tite model of household types with respect to energy 
consumption, in which there is substantial disparity 
between “light”, “medium” and “heavy” energy con-
sumers in the area of home heating. This author argues 
that given a small minority of households are responsi-
ble for around half of energy consumption (while a fifth 
of households, by contrast, consume only 3% of energy), 
it therefore makes sense to target particular types of 
“behavers” rather than energy-use “behaviors.” Other 
studies have also found that households' carbon emis-
sions vary substantially according to socio-economic 
circumstances [e.g., 13,61], leading to the suggestion by 
Brand and Boardman (2008) that reducing national 
carbon emissions principally requires the “taming of 
the few” [62].
We have offered a number of critiques concerning 
the nature, emphases and achievements of conventional 
approaches toward effecting individual and household 
emissions reduction. We suggest that while there is an 
evidence base that behavioral interventions can reliably 
bring about change, this is limited to a small reduction 
in a minority subset of individual emissions, brought 
about principally in experimental settings, and often 
without consideration of the socio-cultural contexts 
within which behavior (change) occurs.
Undoubtedly, the design, implementation and 
appraisal of behavior change schemes have been 
important for understanding the psychological and 
contextual factors which influence pro-environmental 
behavior, and we do not seek to diminish the theoretical 
advances obtained to date. However, we also note that 
the accumulation of ever more nuanced insights in the 
research literature does not in itself lead to any meaning-
ful cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. It is, furthermore, 
unlikely to be a coincidence that the pursuit of behavior 
change and/or individual-level emissions reduction in 
the terms which have prevailed to date has been aligned 
with the current political inclination for neoliberal “soft 
paternalism” [63,64,65] rather than presenting genuine 
challenges to fundamentally unsustainable lifestyles, 
climate policy and governance. Some have indeed 
argued that such a propensity to ascribe responsibility 
primarily to individuals (rather than to governments 
or institutions) for addressing climate change is itself 
a manifestation of dominant political assumptions 
that emphasize the centrality of consumers as rational 
actors in effecting change [14,63,64]. According to Shove 
[14, p. 1274], the predominant policy focus in the UK on 
attitudes, behavior and individual choice “obscures the 
extent to which governments… have a hand in structur-
ing [the] options and possibilities” that are realistically 
available to people.
At a point in time at which there is an urgent need 
to deliver climate change mitigation in all quarters, it 
thus seems legitimate to question whether conventional 
social science approaches have been fit for the purpose 
of substantive emissions reduction – and if not, to ask 
what might constitute a more radical set of approaches.
Radical change from a social science perspective
So what would a social science fit for the purpose of 
radical change look like? Here, we propose three main 
characteristics of a social science reoriented toward radi-
cal emissions reduction.
    Radical social science means advocating for 
change
The issue of reorienting research to achieve radical 
change presupposes that pursuing and promoting 
radical change in people’s lifestyles is an appropri-
ate or desirable goal for the social sciences to seek to 
achieve. At this juncture, it is important to note the 
long-standing debate about the role of the academy in 
“advocating” for particular normative outcomes. At 
its most basic level, the widely accepted “Mertonian” 
norms [66] of how science should be conducted (with 
the most pertinent norm for the purposes of the cur-
rent article being that which prescribes “disinterest-
edness” in scientific enquiry) may be considered to 
be in tension with the goal of enabling or provoking 
“radical change” in behavior through publicly-funded 
social science research. Put simply, it could be argued 
that radical change of any kind should not be the goal 
of empirically grounded disciplines. This position 
would indeed appear to be in line with much previous 
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research in this area, which has been concerned to 
test possibilities for marginal behavior change rather 
than to press for substantive changes to lifestyles and 
social fabrics.
It is clear nonetheless that there are many – typically 
non-contentious – examples of social science research 
adopting an explicitly normative and, at times, uncom-
promising stance in relation to achieving societal goals 
around health or public safety. For several decades, 
social science researchers have asked how to promote 
positive health behaviors such as healthy eating, and 
how to reduce or even eliminate entirely negative health 
behaviors such as smoking [67,68]. That this research 
explicitly contributes toward the normative goal of a 
more healthy society is not considered problematic – 
indeed, is specifically funded by the public purse. As 
Chapman [69, p. 1227] points out:
When public health advocates articulate their goals, 
they seldom attract dissent: few decent people are 
willing to publicly disagree that deaths from heroin 
overdose are tragic, that work environments should 
be safer, or that it would be good if fewer people were 
killed on the roads.
This author goes on to note that although advocacy 
in public health becomes more contentious where par-
ticular strategies for achieving these ends are spelled 
out, nevertheless most health practitioners still feel they 
should be able to advocate for these.
While research on how to promote sustainable behav-
ior is similarly funded through public money in many 
countries, there is, by contrast, a degree of nervousness 
associated with social science aimed at engaging the 
public around pro-environmental behavior, and debate 
within the social sciences about what an appropriate role 
for it should be [e.g., 70]. In a review of the arguments for 
and against advocacy in conservation science, Nelson 
& Vucetich [71] suggest, however, that the most impor-
tant question is not whether scientists should advocate – 
indeed, they argue that advocacy is “nearly unavoidable” – 
but how to do so in a justified and transparent manner. 
These authors argue that refraining from advocacy does 
not constitute the “neutrality” so often invoked as a rea-
son for scientists avoiding policy debates. Instead, they 
suggest, refraining from advocacy effectively constitutes 
implicit support for the status quo. Because climate 
change is among those environmental problems which 
are direct outcomes of dominant culture, institutions 
and policies, there is an argument that this places a 
particular obligation to speak out: “Just as being neutral 
toward child abuse guarantees children will be abused, 
neutrality about environmental abuse guarantees envi-
ronmental abuse. Arguably, many current policy issues 
are like this. They are clearly bad, and scientists are 
responsible for knowing that” [71, p. 1095].
The first challenge, therefore, in developing a social 
science fit for the purpose of engendering radical shifts 
in public responses to climate change is for the social sci-
ences to become comfortable with the idea of promoting 
substantive lifestyle change as a normative aim, and to 
do so alongside explicit advocacy for changes to cultural 
and policy contexts that would make this possible.
Precedents exist for such an advocacy model in other 
domains. For example, the Campaign for Science and 
Engineering (CASE) is a British pressure group that 
lobbies politically to raise the profile of science and 
engineering, and advocates for the economic and cul-
tural importance of science. It includes in its aims such 
explicitly political goals as promoting the scholarly value 
of immigration, and fighting for increased funding for 
science from the government. If a social science fit for 
radical decarbonization were to be developed, an analo-
gous organization – a campaign for the value and soci-
etal worth of engaging the public in pro-environmental 
change – might be required.
Such advocacy of radical pro-environmental lifestyle 
change need not constitute a fringe activity, occurring 
outside of mainstream academia and undertaken only 
by an especially strident group of practitioners. For 
example, a recent Nature Climate Change editorial [72] 
approvingly cited a proposal by World Bank President 
Jim Kim to establish an international “movement” that 
includes concerned scientists, non-governmental organ-
izations and civil society to address climate change:
Such a lobby – “Campaign Climate,” if you like – 
with genuine grassroots involvement would in the 
eyes of many be more than a match for climate change 
sceptics and vested interest groups, and perhaps more 
effective than the scientific community alone in apply-
ing pressure on national governments to act. [72, p. 849]
Proponents of such a campaign might indeed be sur-
prised to encounter a public that is more responsive 
than is often assumed to be the case: recent research in 
the US by Leiserowitz et al. [73] has found that three in 
10 Americans either have joined or would join a cam-
paign to convince elected officials to address climate 
change, and, more strikingly still, that around a quarter 
of Americans would, under some circumstances, sup-
port non-violent civil disobedience as part of action on 
climate change [73].
    Radical social science means focussing on the 
sources and underlying causes of high emissions
As well as being open to a more advocative stance, the 
second challenge for a genuinely radical social science is 
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to orient research toward the topics of enquiry where the 
most impact in terms of carbon emissions can be made. 
There have been previous calls to do just this: Steg and 
Vlek [11] have stressed that environmental psychologists 
should focus their attention on behaviors that are most 
impactful, noting for example that lowering thermo-
stat settings or reducing car use has greater merit than 
the reuse of plastic bags in stores. However, and as we 
outline above, there has been an implicit assumption 
that the scope of “behavior” within which such relative 
comparisons are made excludes indirect emissions (com-
parisons with bag reuse notwithstanding); in addition, 
there has been little consideration of the characteristics 
of individuals and households from which the majority 
of emissions derive.
A useful starting point in an attempt to spotlight 
areas of high emissions at the household level is the 
consistent finding that carbon emissions increase 
sharply with income [39,40,74,75]. With respect to per-
sonal travel, for example, the top 10% of emitters are 
responsible for close to half of all emissions, while the 
share of the bottom 10% of emitters is closer to 1%; 
much of this difference is in turn underpinned by 
household income [62].
The use of input–output models that extend carbon 
accounting to both indirect and direct emissions, and 
can attribute these to final demand categories [76], ena-
bles a more nuanced understanding of the distribution 
of emissions across households than has been typical 
in social science interventions to date. These methods 
are additionally valuable for their ability to attribute 
emissions to “functional uses” in terms of the various 
activities that comprise daily life, such as recreation 
and leisure, health and hygiene, and commuting [13]. 
This provides the potential to address part of the criti-
cism levelled by social practice theorists that a focus on 
“behavior” neglects the everyday meanings underly-
ing people's actions, as well as offering the opportu-
nity to pinpoint variability in emissions by socioeco-
nomic groupings. To give an example, Druckman and 
Jackson [13] observe that a quarter of all emissions derive 
from recreation and leisure (including personal avia-
tion), and that people living in “prospering suburbs” 
have the highest per-capita emissions across a range of 
socioeconomic categories. Their analysis also suggests 
that the category of “health and hygiene” – which has 
obtained something of an iconic status of its own within 
the social practice literature in the context of changing 
social conventions around showering and cleanliness 
[77–79] – is a relatively less impactful area.
An important conclusion that can be drawn from 
these studies is that a more radical approach to behavior 
and lifestyle change would pursue change in consump-
tion domains, and within social groups, that are of the 
most significance for carbon emissions. For example, 
rather than conducting studies on recycling behavior 
among the general public (as has been commonplace 
thus far), research might instead seek ways of address-
ing emissions from personal aviation by those on high 
incomes. It is clear that this would not be an easy task – 
as illustrated by the almost complete absence of previous 
work attempting to do so – but nevertheless, any effort 
to radically reduce personal emissions would need to 
come to terms with such challenges.
An additional conclusion that can be drawn across a 
range of carbon accounting studies, as we note above, 
is that indirect emissions in the form of consumption 
of products and services – including, for example, food 
and drink, alcohol and consumer electronics – consti-
tute the major part of total household emissions. With 
this in mind, Gough (2013) demonstrates that there is a 
strong argument for policy and interventions to address 
embedded carbon in parallel with approaches for reduc-
ing direct emissions through behavior change [42].
The potential for a citizen-led response in a sustain-
able direction with respect to carbon embedded in eve-
ryday purchases and activities has now been acknowl-
edged across a wider sustainable consumption literature 
[80,81]. While this literature is concerned with matters 
beyond emissions reduction, the idea that people may 
make a positive impact has been promoted through 
means such as carbon labelling of consumer durables 
and food [82] and through the “social marketing” of 
sustainability more generally [83].
This said, the sustainable consumption agenda as 
a whole has moved away from an earlier interest in 
bringing about radical transformations in lifestyles, 
and toward a less contentious focus on the marketing 
of “green” products such as biodegradable washing 
powder or low-energy light bulbs [84]. As Seyfang [84] 
notes, critics of the sustainable consumption paradigm 
have argued that it has neglected a fundamental point, 
namely that “the most sustainable product is the one 
you never bought in the first place” [202]. Jackson and 
Michaelis [85, p. 20] likewise remark that: “[m]ore radi-
cal environmentalists and social critics emphasise the 
importance of remaining open to the possibility that we 
could live better by consuming less.”
The difficulty for any social science seeking to delib-
erately promote reduced consumption as a means of 
lowering people's embedded carbon emissions is that 
such an approach immediately collides with powerful 
and deep-rooted political and economic assumptions 
about the importance of consumer spending as a means 
of driving economic growth. Indeed, the paradigm of 
economic growth is itself used as a proxy for societal 
well-being [86]. Nevertheless, numerous authors and 
activists have now made the case for reducing absolute 
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consumption for the purposes of addressing climate 
change and other environmental problems [e.g., 87–89], as 
well as for wider reasons of pursuing different and better 
versions of prosperity and wellbeing [86,90,91].
Lifestyle change characterized by low levels of con-
sumption is often described as “downshifting” or “vol-
untary simplicity” [92,93]. Under a carefully constructed 
reduced consumption scenario – in which people are 
able to have a “decent” standard of living and to partici-
pate in society, but where there is nevertheless reduced 
materialism and less focus on “status-driven consumer-
ism” – Druckman and Jackson (2010) have shown there 
is the potential for annual household emissions to fall by 
37% (though it should be noted that this figure incor-
porates reductions across all aspects of a household's 
footprint) [94].
Given the need to encourage changes to patterns of 
consumption, it is encouraging that members of the 
public themselves recognize the problems arising from 
excess materialism (including its association with lower 
well-being [95]). Research in the US has shown that a 
majority of research participants supported reducing 
total consumption, and were of the opinion that doing 
so would improve individual and societal well-being [96]. 
While more “environmentalists” and liberal voters were 
of the view that reducing absolute consumption was 
desirable, even among conservative voters this major-
ity agreement held. Likewise, in separate studies it has 
been observed that the adoption of an ethic of “frugal-
ity” comprising lowered consumption is commonplace 
among research participants attempting to reduce their 
environmental impacts [15,97].
Given the critical importance of embedded emis-
sions, we suggest that a more radical social science 
would be forthright about the need to achieve changes 
to consumption patterns to limit these, and would seek 
actively to promote this at the individual and house-
hold level. A more radical social science approach 
would comprise deliberate attempts to bring about 
change in areas of relatively high impact, whether cor-
responding to particular groups of citizens or types of 
consumption activity. It would, in addition, seek to 
promote reductions in absolute levels of consumption 
across society.
    Radical social science means integrating 
disciplinary approaches
In addition to recognizing and targeting areas of high 
emissions, the third challenge for a genuinely radical 
social science is to develop a more integrated outlook 
on the opportunities for reducing carbon emissions at 
the individual and household level.
As we have outlined above, much of the work 
carried out to date which has aimed to understand 
and influence people's carbon emissions has adopted 
individuals or specific “behaviors” as units of analy-
sis. Most psychological approaches follow a similar 
accepted format: an assessment of the behavior in its 
social and physical context, the design of an interven-
tion (targeting the antecedents and/or consequences 
of the behavior), application of the intervention and 
assessment of the intervention's impact [98]. It has, 
however, been argued that such a focus on the exter-
nal observable behaviors of individuals and their psy-
chological determinants detracts from in-depth con-
sideration and understanding of the complexity and 
influence of the social, economic and political con-
texts in which those behaviors are manifest, arise and 
develop [29,56,99]. Critics of individualistic approaches 
have argued that over-reliance on psychological and 
behavioral factors overlooks the important relation-
ships between these components.
By contrast, high-carbon ways of living viewed from 
a different perspective will result in a different under-
standing of resource use and actions associated with 
these [100]. In particular, through the lens of social prac-
tice theory (SPT), an objective of lowered carbon emis-
sions requires addressing the widespread but ordinary 
or “inconspicuous” consumption practices that make 
up everyday life [101]. In SPT, the unit of analysis is 
the practice, which can be considered the materially 
and socially interconnected ways of doing things by 
individuals within communities (e.g., cooking, bath-
ing, commuting) [14,102]. SPT theorists have tended to 
describe the elements comprising practices in terms of 
“materials” (including infrastructure), “competences” 
(including knowledge and social norms) and “mean-
ings” (including culturally shared notions).
SPT has been used to examine the constitution and 
dynamics of routines in everyday lives and their impli-
cations for sustainability, and has gained considerable 
interest in academic circles in recent years [102,103]. 
Jackson [24] suggests it has gained less traction among 
policy-makers, however, in part because it has been dif-
ficult to see how such approaches could actually be put 
to practical use [24]. That said, there have been attempts 
made by practice theorists to elucidate the means by 
which policy strategies could potentially be understood 
in these terms [101,104].
It should be noted at this juncture that SPT prac-
titioners in the sustainability domain have in some 
cases gone out of their way to define these approaches 
in direct opposition to those deriving from behavioral 
science [14,105]. Indeed, Shove [14] has argued that social 
theories of practice are entirely incompatible with theo-
ries of behavior, due to these two approaches having 
different assumptions about the drivers and contexts 
of sustainability.
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While theoretical and practical compatibilities 
among the various social science disciplinary perspec-
tives do require careful consideration, nevertheless, a 
fragmented and fractious relationship between para-
digms seems to us unlikely to advance the more impor-
tant objective of emissions reduction. In line with Kurz 
et al. [106], we suggest instead that it may be at the inter-
sections between different theoretical approaches and 
paradigms that novel and important policy interven-
tions are likely to be obtained.
In a situation where an understanding of the char-
acteristics and motivations of individuals, on the one 
hand, and the socially organized nature of practices, on 
the other, are both necessary but neither (on their own) 
sufficient to pursue the objective of reduced household 
carbon emissions, a more promising approach would 
be to seek out synergies between traditions. Viewed 
from the perspective of solving an urgent and practi-
cal problem (rather than from a particular discipline's 
favored ontological assumptions), it is simply not fea-
sible to make progress on climate change in methodo-
logical silos. So while the prospect of integrating across 
social science disciplines may appear “radical” from 
an academic perspective, not pooling and integrating 
expertise may appear a perverse choice from beyond 
the academy.
In this vein, some have appealed for greater toler-
ance and integrative working across social science dis-
ciplines, and noted the potential benefits from bringing 
together evidence and theory from different disciplinary 
perspectives that nonetheless pursue the same end of 
understanding and promoting a low-carbon society [107]. 
Hardisty et al. [108], for example, have presented  evidence 
through a series of case studies that an integration of 
disciplinary perspectives to environmental policy (in 
their case, from economics, psychology and anthropol-
ogy) results in an approach that is more than the sum of 
its parts. These authors argue in particular that includ-
ing insights from social science approaches that might 
otherwise be considered “orthogonal” to the  others 
enables blind spots to be indentified and overcome. 
Rowson and Corner [109] likewise argue that any mean-
ingful communication with the public around climate 
change needs to make explicit the interconnecting links 
between climate change and seven key “dimensions” 
(including science, culture, economy and democracy) – 
of which “behavior” is only one.
There have now been a number of conceptual models 
proposed within which different disciplinary insights 
into behavior and lifestyle change are either integrated, 
or addressed in a complementary manner. We give 
examples of four such approaches below.
In direct response to the public debate on the tensions 
between SPT and behavioral approaches to addressing 
climate change, and in keeping with a philosophical 
tradition of pragmatism [110], several authors have pro-
posed ways of drawing on the insights from these two 
paradigms to achieve practical responses to climate 
change. Wilson and Chatterton [111] argue that study-
ing behavior as an object of inquiry is not inconsistent 
with practice theory, in which behaviors can be seen as 
“physical manifestations of practices.” These authors 
argue that emission-related behaviors vary widely in 
their characteristics and contexts, implying a need for 
diverse models and levers for change. Consequently, 
they propose a guide for policy-makers in selecting and 
using different models of behavior/practice, based on 
the criteria of “actors” (individuals, networks, popu-
lations), “scope” (isolated actions, catalyst behaviors, 
lifestyles), “durabilities” (one-off behaviors, repeated 
actions, habits) and domains (psychological, physical, 
social) of behavior. Depending on the aims of a prac-
titioner, policy interventions could range from aware-
ness campaigns through deliberative fora, to taxation, 
regulation or product labelling.
While Wilson and Chatterton advocate integrat-
ing insights from multiple paradigms, they stop short 
of advocating a more comprehensive integration across 
different disciplinary traditions, affirming instead the 
advantages of an openness to multiple (sometimes con-
tradictory) models of behavior and lifestyles. Others 
have, however, gone further to argue for integrative 
theoretical models that combine psychological and 
sociological elements in order to overcome the limita-
tions of each.
Boldero and Binder [112], for example, have pro-
posed that the model of recursive cultural adaptation 
(MORCA) comprises just such an integrated approach 
able to accommodate insights from across disciplines 
[113], notably psychology, sociology and philosophy. In 
a similar way to that proposed by SPT, these authors see 
practices as constituting social structures which estab-
lish rules for behavior – as representing the non-con-
scious “way things are done” – which serve the purpose 
of defining the relationships between people and their 
environment. However, this model also recognizes that 
individuals are motivated to engage their own agency 
(i.e., to exercise their preferences and choices) under 
certain situations, such as when there are perceived to 
be changes to social norms, and it is at these times that 
practices are amenable to being changed or overridden. 
The authors provide empirical support for the model in 
the context of showering, water conservation and build-
ing firms' innovation, highlighting successful practical 
interventions to influence behavior (at different scales by 
different types of actors) and thus addressing something 
of a weakness in the SPT literature which has tended to 
adopt a more descriptive focus [106].
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A third approach, which draws on multi-disciplinary 
insights into energy use, is the “Energy Cultures” frame-
work, described by Stephenson et al. (2010) as a “culture-
based approach to behavior” which is designed to help 
identify opportunities for behavior change [114,115]. This 
framework proposes that people's energy use behavior 
be understood in terms of interactions between cogni-
tive norms (e.g., individual beliefs, values), material cul-
ture (including technology and structural factors) and 
energy practices (e.g., the typical temperature to which 
a home is heated). The potential for behavior change 
arises when there is a shift in one of these components: 
this may occur at the individual level, such as a change 
in attitudes toward energy efficiency, or at the structural 
level, such as the provision of government subsidies for 
insulation.
Fourth, the multi-level perspective (MLP) in the 
socio-technical transitions literature is increasingly 
being applied to explore the potential for radical change 
in numerous contexts, from resource use to water sys-
tems and mobility [116,117]. The MLP has made sig-
nificant contributions to sustainability modelling and 
social research by providing a more integrated and 
systemic perspective on socio-technical change, based 
on detailed historical (and some contemporary) case 
studies and theoretical literatures. However, while the 
MLP has drawn heavily on economics and sociology 
literatures, it has not yet adequately incorporated behav-
ioral and political science insights to fully elucidate how 
behavioral–institutional change might occur, nor has it 
considered how its core conceptual bases may relate to 
social practice theory [118].
While it is not our intention to recommend any of 
these particular approaches over others, they neverthe-
less serve to illustrate the potential for more compre-
hensive and far-reaching ways of conceptualizing the 
relationships between individual factors, elements of 
practice and wider social and structural contexts. We 
suggest that the prospects for a more radical social 
science would be greatly enhanced if future research 
sought to understand and influence carbon emissions 
in these different but interlocking ways.
Radical change in the environmental and 
institutional domains
We have outlined three key challenges that we consider 
central to the development of a more radical social sci-
ence of climate change: the need for advocacy of radical 
change, the need for a focus on areas of high emis-
sions and the need for more integrated social science 
approaches.
In conceptualizing what is represented by change in a 
radical direction, we have proposed that this may relate 
either to that which brings about radical environmental 
impacts – relating to the scale of emissions cuts needed 
to effectively mitigate climate change – or to radical 
institutional impacts – relating to challenging the status 
quo and the transformation of social science approaches 
to behavior and lifestyle change.
Each of the three challenges we outline emphasizes in 
different ways these two versions of radical change, as 
summarized in Table 1. In the case of our recommen-
dation for more forthright advocacy of change, there 
is a stress upon a direct contestation of the status quo: 
rather than the maintenance of a neutral or impartial 
position, a more radical set of approaches would una-
shamedly adopt a normative stance that took serious 
issue with the high-carbon lifestyles that are currently 
the norm in many parts of the world. In the case of 
a re-emphasis on areas of high emissions, this would 
also entail confronting assumptions which sustain the 
status quo, but would principally entail a more stra-
tegic focus on those behaviors and practices that are, 
quantifiably, the most environmentally impactful. In 
the case of more integrative social science approaches, 
our focus is on institutional impacts, entailing new ways 
of understanding and influencing those behaviors and 
social contexts that give rise to persistently high levels 
of emissions. Nevertheless, this manner of integration 
would be pursued ultimately to bring about more effec-
tive approaches to climate change mitigation.
Next, we present two case studies that are designed to 
demonstrate the ways in which more radical emissions 
reduction could practically be brought about at the indi-
vidual and household level. In the first case, we consider 
Table 1. Characteristics of radical approaches to behavior and lifestyle change.
Summary description Principal focus of change Illustrative sources
Advocating for change Pursuit of normative stance that 
challenges assumptions behind 
unsustainable ways of living
Institutional [71,72]
Focus upon sources and 
causes of high emissions
Re-orientation of inquiry and 
interventions to areas of most 
importance to climate change
Environmental [42,87]
Integrating disciplinary 
approaches
Bringing together of evidence and theory 
from different disciplinary approaches
Institutional and 
environmental
[108,114]
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personal mobility, which represents a set of behaviors 
encompassing over a quarter of UK households' direct 
emissions, and yet is an area that has proved intractable 
to change. In the second case, we consider elements of 
consumer behavior and culture, aspects of which are 
both deeply embedded and highly impactful in terms 
of carbon emissions.
Case study: mobility
Travel represents 27% of UK households' direct carbon 
emissions (of which 67% is accounted for by owning 
and running a car [119]), yet it is among the least popular 
behavioral changes for tackling climate change due to 
a range of cultural, psychological and physical barriers 
[52,120]. Indeed, in respect of determinants of low-carbon 
travel behavior, location, income, demographics and (to 
a lesser extent) values are important [121]. Thus, as a case 
study, mobility is both pragmatically and scientifically 
significant, and demands bringing together social (and 
other) sciences in interdisciplinary collaborations.
Much is known about how to achieve change in 
mobility behavior – although less is known about how to 
achieve change that can be considered radical. Evidence 
highlights the need for a range of interventions, includ-
ing both “hard” and “soft” (i.e., infrastructural and 
other, e.g., informational, organizational, economic) 
measures. While social marketing measures (e.g., per-
sonal and organizational travel planning), car sharing, 
teleworking and other “smarter choice” measures can 
encourage modal shift and reduced demand [122], such 
approaches must be accompanied by harder, infrastruc-
tural and fiscal measures to lock in behavior change 
and avoid rebound effects, undesirable modal shift or 
induced traffic. For example, unintended adverse conse-
quences include information and communications tech-
nology generating transport demand through newly cre-
ated relationships, new public transport services drawing 
demand from other public or active modes instead of 
from drivers and traffic reduction measures freeing up 
road space and attracting more drivers [123,124]. This 
highlights the need for integrated, long-term transport 
and spatial planning that addresses the multiple drivers 
of demand and the range of social, economic and envi-
ronmental consequences of interventions. Furthermore, 
interventions need to be targeted appropriately to the 
particular context, including factors such as popula-
tion density, extant transport or energy infrastructure, 
local policies, cultural norms and patterns of demand 
[125]. Adopting a participatory approach to developing 
transport policies is also likely to foster more acceptable, 
fairer and sustainable outcomes [126, though see 127].
Concrete examples of effective interventions are evi-
dent in the UK, such as the Cycling Cities and Towns 
initiative (increasing cycling by 27%) and London 
congestion charge (reducing congestion by around 
30%) [128]. Schemes to reduce road capacity have led to 
a mean reduction of 22% in traffic volume, while “soft 
measures” (e.g., teleworking) can produce a 21% cut 
in urban peak hour traffic [123]. More ambitious and 
wide-ranging improvements to transport systems have 
taken place within European cities, such as Stockholm, 
Malmö, Montpelier and Copenhagen, due to strong 
sustainable transport and land-use policies (including 
greater public transport subsidies, and transport coor-
dination). For example, Copenhagen's walkable urban 
environment means car use only accounts for 27% of 
work trips, while cycle use accounts for 36% [122]. More 
sizeable reductions in driving have been recorded where 
interventions are focused at the organizational level: for 
example, up to 66% decrease in vehicle miles travelled 
where telecommuting schemes are introduced in work-
places [129]. A recent meta-analysis by Graham-Rowe 
et al. [130] of research into changing car use behavior 
found that, while the evidence base was limited, more 
effective interventions included those that targeted peo-
ple who have just moved residence, drivers with a strong 
driving habit or strong moral motivation to reduce car 
use, and relocating employees to reduce commuting 
time [130].
In line with this conclusion, a particularly promis-
ing avenue for behavior change based on psychological 
principles, but consistent with social practices literature, 
is that of “habit discontinuity” [131]. Information about 
alternative behaviors/choices (e.g., bus travel) tends 
to be ignored when people have strong habits (e.g., to 
regularly drive [132]), but when habits are disrupted by 
a change in circumstances (e.g., through relocation or a 
new job), behavior-relevant information becomes more 
salient and influential, thus providing an important 
window of opportunity to intervene to change behavior 
[133]. This line of research suggests relatively low-cost or 
“soft” measures can have significant impact on mobility 
behaviors if they are timed to when there is a relevant 
context change [134].
In sum, there is a wealth of evidence to show that 
mobility behavior can be changed, ideally through a 
combination of measures, and where these are effec-
tively targeted (e.g., to context change moments, audi-
ence values, organizations [37]). Much of this can be 
considered incremental change, but examples of 20, 
30 or even over 60% reductions in car use have been 
recorded in the most effective schemes.
Regarding the arguments we make above concerning 
the need for integrated disciplinary approaches, the case 
of mobility illustrates that the more successful interven-
tions are likely to be those which set out to change travel 
behavior through a comprehensive set of approaches and 
insights. Individualistic or psychologically informed 
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techniques have the potential to bring about some 
degree of behavior change, for example through “habit 
disruption” or the use of personal travel planning. 
However, the extent of such change is likely to be lim-
ited, and may be temporary, without adjustments to the 
cultural and structural factors – such as the expectations 
and practices of employers, and limitations of public 
transport – that have themselves led to the widespread 
reliance by many people upon cars for their mobility.
So far, less work has explored how to change fly-
ing behavior than has addressed modal shifts in more 
ubiquitous travel behaviors (particularly reducing car 
travel); yet, increasingly, this is likely to be even harder – 
and more important – to change than driving behavior 
[135]. The challenge of addressing flying is particularly 
pronounced because whether people travel frequently 
by air, or refrain from doing so, does not correlate with 
environmental awareness [136] and also constitutes an 
emotionally charged topic even for raising in discus-
sion [137,138], as well as a “political minefield” [139]. 
Promotion of “slow travel” and voluntary changes to 
flying frequency [135,138] are two means by which the 
public might be engaged in reducing this component of 
personal emissions, although it is far from clear whether 
such approaches would be effective, given continu-
ally growing expectations of regular international air 
travel. Indeed, Higham et al. [139] argue that voluntary 
approaches alone will be insufficient to change current 
air travel practices in a manner commensurate with 
radical emissions reduction. Based on research with 
members of the public in four European nations and 
Australia, these authors conclude that altering behavior 
in this domain will require diverse strategies at both the 
individual and structural levels, but that ultimately an 
absence of regulatory measures constitutes the main 
barrier to bringing about changes in air travel behavior.
Case study: consumer culture and the pursuit 
of things
At least as environmentally impactful an area, and no 
less intractable, is the portion of carbon emissions deriv-
ing from our spending on, and acquisition of, consumer 
products and services. Given that consumer behavior 
permeates many aspects of everyday life, and is directed 
to end products encompassing everything from pet food 
to footwear to personal computers, we can only offer 
here an imprecise treatment of a highly complex area. 
Nevertheless, we briefly outline some of the means 
by which consumer culture has been understood and 
critiqued, and consider implications for more radical 
approaches to addressing climate change in the personal 
domain.
Historians have traced the origins of modern con-
sumer society to the growth in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Europe of rising material expecta-
tions and acquisitiveness [140]. While “consumerism” is 
often used as a pejorative term, it is nevertheless argued 
to be so pervasive as to constitute a “way of life” through 
which social relations are played out [141]; indeed, with-
out consumer goods, certain acts of self- and collective 
definition would be impossible in contemporary society 
[142]. It has also been argued that conspicuous consump-
tion has profound psychological underpinnings, based 
on a deeply human and cultural need to “provide mean-
ing and value…in the face of death” [143, p. 132], and 
for achieving and demonstrating status, self-worth and 
group membership [144,145].
Despite the centrality of consumer culture to con-
temporary lives, it is clear that consumerism is never-
theless strongly connected to high carbon emissions. 
Assadourian [146] argues that it is in those countries 
where consumerism is the cultural norm where emis-
sions are highest in global terms, and that as a conse-
quence consumption patterns require urgent redirec-
tion. Jackson [86] likewise argues for the systematic 
“dismantling” of the culture of consumerism and its 
replacement with viable opportunities for less materi-
alistic ways of life. Because of the ubiquitous functions 
that consumerism provides, any efforts to reduce con-
sumption will, however, be unlikely to succeed unless 
the same sorts of intangible benefits and social meanings 
it provides can be delivered by other means [84].
Unlike the promotion of discrete pro-environmental 
behaviors, the establishment of an ethic of reduced – 
and/or radically different types of – consumption is 
likely to require sustained efforts at a community and 
societal level. From her consideration of a number of 
grassroots approaches to sustainable consumption, 
Seyfang [84] argues that community-building and shared 
action constitute key elements of a creative and practica-
ble form of ecological citizenship, entailing responsibil-
ity for the environmental impacts of individual behavior, 
as well as for a wider political engagement (see also [147]).
The achievement of such ecological citizenship as 
part of wider social networks is unlikely to fit the pro-
totypical mold of structured interventions typical across 
the social sciences to date [98]. Moving to low-carbon 
lifestyles will instead require forms of collective action 
that go beyond the bounds of current government policy 
[42] and which may typically be expected to occur at 
local scales and to develop in innovative, unexpected 
and dynamic ways [148,149].
There may, nevertheless, be a role for the social sci-
ences in supporting radically different ways of organiz-
ing society, although it has been argued that the transla-
tion of “niche” activity into a more mainstream agenda 
is inherently problematic [150]. Likewise, while there is 
no simple formula through which to address what Miles 
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(1998) terms the “consuming paradox” [141] whereby 
consumption fulfils complex human needs while lead-
ing to ever-increasing carbon emissions, many studies 
have now recognized that high levels of consumption are 
associated with particular types of materialistic values 
at both the individual and community levels [151,152]. 
By contrast, low levels of consumption are consistently 
found to be associated with “other-regarding” values 
such as social justice [15,153]. In light of this, the oppor-
tunity exists for social scientists to find ways to pro-
mote and foster the types of values and attitudes which 
underpin pro-environmental lifestyles – and which are 
diametrically opposed to more materialistic ways of 
living [29,154]. One of the most effective ways for pro-
environmental behavior to be promoted may indeed be 
through the “drawing out” of deep-seated principles and 
values which are already harbored by people, and which, 
with appropriate encouragement, are able to lead to more 
enduring types of environmental citizenship [155].
As with the case of mobility, considered above, any 
radical changes to patterns of consumer behavior will 
likely require efforts drawing on disparate disciplinary 
approaches. It is clear that individual values and atti-
tudes are powerful determinants of consumer choices of 
relevance to climate change, and as such natural terri-
tory for psychologists seeking to effect change. It is also 
clear, however, that a person's behavior does not exist in 
isolation from the cultural and historical contexts that 
have established consumerism so pervasively in con-
temporary society. As such, any possibility of radical 
change would require the insights of sociologists and 
other social scientists who recognize the potential for 
reconfiguration of practices that underpin high emis-
sions in this domain.
Conclusion
This article has explored the extent to which radi-
cal emissions reduction at individual and household 
scales may be achievable through approaches currently 
available within the social sciences. We conclude that 
implicit in these approaches are a variety of assumptions 
and conventions that have limited the promotion and 
practical implementation of significant emissions cuts. 
We have proceeded to consider what might constitute a 
more radical set of approaches, given that conventional 
ones – to date – have not been fit for purpose. This paper 
proposes that a social science reoriented toward radical 
change would not refrain from advocating particular 
strategies aimed at achieving substantive changes to 
lifestyles and social structures, but do so in a justified 
and transparent manner; focus purposefully – but not 
exclusively – on the sources and causes underpinning 
high emissions in order to orient research toward those 
areas where the gains are to be maximized; become 
more integrative of disparate disciplinary perspectives, 
in order to pursue the potential for radical change using 
different conceptualizations of individuals in their 
socio-cultural contexts.
We are not naïvely anticipating that social science 
approaches to behavior and lifestyle change can be 
rapidly re-invented to become “radical”, substantially 
reformed in contrast to how they have developed to 
date. We are mindful that the proposals advanced in 
this paper would require open and honest conversations 
among groups and communities that may be willing to 
offer their (sometimes ontologically diverse) understand-
ings of the world. This may lead to compromise on some 
aspects of research in order to entertain the possibility of 
bringing together perspectives with a view to achieving 
radical change. This article has elucidated examples of 
where some of these conversations are already occur-
ring, and others still where ground is fertile. It illustrates 
also that this extension is necessary beyond the social 
sciences; there are some aspects of emissions reduction 
that require more in-depth understanding by working 
with community groups and activists, as well as with 
natural and material scientists.
The examinations and reflections in this paper point 
to areas where the social sciences could demonstrate the 
ability to become radical: identifying opportunities for 
making the most impact, and developing interdiscipli-
nary joining-up of existing frameworks such as those 
identified above, as well as others which may become 
relevant as these connections are explored. This in turn 
may lead to innovative combinations of approaches and 
methods that to date have remained siloed and distinct.
The proposals contained in this paper are geared 
toward rethinking the contributions that social sci-
ences can make toward environmental sustainability, 
broadly speaking. We do not shy from the first element 
we suggest for a radical social science, namely advocacy. 
Our goal is to provoke our readers into reflecting in 
depth about what has been achieved so far and where 
the potential lies for advancing deeper emissions reduc-
tion, and to encourage and spur colleagues and critics 
to engage in conversations about which useful ways 
forward could be enacted and how. Climate change 
demands urgent alternatives – many other social and 
environmental problems do too.
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